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THE PROLONGED ARM OF THE LAW: FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES, THE MAYNARD 
DECISION, AND THE NEED FOR A NEW WARRANT 
FOR ELECTRONIC TRACKING 
Reeve Wood* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2010, a NPR story recounted how when Yasir Afifi, a California 
college student of Egyptian extraction, took his car in for an oil change, his 
mechanic saw a suspicious wire hanging from the bottom of the vehicle.1  
Following the wire, the mechanic located a black object secured to the car with a 
magnet.2  When a friend took photographs of the object and posted them on an 
internet chat site, he was told that the object was a GPS tracking unit.3  This was 
confirmed when, several days later, FBI agents and police officers arrived at Afifi’s 
house to reclaim their equipment.4  To date, Mr. Afifi has not been charged with a 
crime, but when he filed a FOIA request to uncover information about the FBI’s 
investigation into his activities, the FBI called his counsel and informed them that 
an investigation was ongoing.5 
This story, which raises more questions than it answers, illustrates a growing 
trend in American law enforcement: the deployment of tracking devices capable of 
recording an individual’s travels over long periods of time and relaying location 
information to officers at the time of their choosing.  This kind of device allows for 
officers to keep tabs on people without having to rely on costly, fallible 
surveillance performed directly by officers.  Instead, tracking devices operate as a 
sort of “set-it-and-forget-it” surveillance team.  The Afifi story would also seem to 
illustrate another aspect of the growing deployment of tracking devices: the lack of 
procedural safeguards for those being tracked.  In fact, as the issue stands today, in 
most jurisdictions officers don’t even have to talk to a judge, much less get a 
warrant to install one of these units.6 
And tracking is not just limited to GPS units placed on cars.  Cell phones carry 
the potential to become tracking devices, snitching from inside the pockets and 
purses of their owners.  Over the last decade, officers have widely requested 
records of the automatic signals that all cell phones transmit in relaying their 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maine School of Law.   
 1. Mina Kim, FBI’s GPS Tracking Raises Privacy Concerns, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 27, 2010) 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833487; Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on 
Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, WIRED (Oct. 7, 2010 10:13 PM), http://www.wired.com/ 
threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device. 
 2. Zetter, supra note 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Complaint at 2, Afifi v. Holder, No. 11-CV-00460, 2011 WL 726346 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2011). 
 6. See infra section IV.B-C. 
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location information to the service provider.  And while they do have to talk to a 
judge to get this information, in many cases, they don’t even have to make a 
showing of probable cause to obtain an order compelling the release of the data. 
While these capabilities aid the ability of police departments and law-
enforcement agencies to take on broader investigative burdens, there is something 
about stories like Mr. Afifi’s that unsettles many people.  As one circuit court of 
appeals judge has put it, making the obligatory Orwell reference in the process,  
I don’t think that most people in the United States would agree . . . that someone 
who leaves his car parked in his driveway outside the door of his home invites 
people to crawl under it and attach a device that will track the vehicle’s every 
movement and transmit that information to total strangers. There is something 
creepy and un-American about such clandestine and underhanded behavior. To 
those of us who have lived under a totalitarian regime, there is an eerie feeling of 
déjà vu . . . . We are taking a giant leap into the unknown, and the consequences 
for ourselves and our children may be dire and irreversible. Some day, soon, we 
may wake up and find we’re living in Oceania.7 
Indeed, the ability to easily track the whereabouts of citizens without having to 
adhere to procedural safeguards of the warrant requirement lends itself to dystopian 
visions of a state where the government can keep tabs on all its citizens.  However, 
as the findings of the Church Committee on Intelligence Activities demonstrated in 
1976, such dark imaginings are not without real grounding in our recent history:  
We have seen segments of our Government, in their attitudes and action, adopt 
tactics unworthy of a democracy, and occasionally reminiscent of the tactics of 
totalitarian regimes. We have seen a consistent pattern in which programs initiated 
with limited goals, such as preventing criminal violence or identifying foreign 
spies, were expanded to what witnesses characterized as “vacuum cleaners[],” 
sweeping in information about lawful activities of American citizens.8 
Despite concerns that tracking technology could open the door to similar 
government abuses, until recently, courts confronted with tracking technology have 
largely held that it was excluded from the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
because tracking individuals in public places did not violate a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy.”9  However, in August 2010, the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the District of Colombia held in United States. v. Maynard10 that the use of a 
GPS tracking device was a search under the Fourth Amendment.11  The Maynard 
court provided a rationale for treating prolonged tracking as a search on the 
grounds that such long-term tracking was able to paint an “intimate picture” of a 
                                                                                                     
 7. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 8. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., REP. ON INTELLIGENCE 
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS § I(A) (1976) [hereinafter Church Committee], available 
at http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalreportIIa.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2011). 
 9. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring) (stating that a 
government interference is a search where “first, . . . a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and second, . . . the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”). 
 10. 615 F.3d. 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 
(June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 11. Id. at 555. 
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person’s life, a picture that the individual concerned would not expect others to 
have sufficient information to piece together.12  Working as it does within the 
framework of the established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this rationale has 
been adopted by several federal magistrate judges dealing with the issue of whether 
the release of cell phone location information constitutes a search and has 
energized the debate over how courts should deal with electronic tracking.  And 
now, after granting certiorari, the Supreme Court will review the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Maynard (under the case name of United States. v. Jones) and pass its 
ultimate judgment on whether, under this theory, the use of prolonged electronic 
tracking constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.13 
This article examines the Maynard decision as well as the simultaneous 
emergence of a vocal set of magistrate judges advocating for Fourth Amendment 
protection for cell phone location information.  It argues that, even if the Maynard 
rationale is widely adopted and the use of tracking devices14 is found to be a search, 
the Fourth Amendment principles of specificity and limited discretion on the part 
of government officers mean that the warrant frameworks currently in use will not 
provide adequate protection from the threat of government officers obtaining 
information for which they have not demonstrated a need.  Finally, it suggests 
several concepts to be adopted into a new electronic tracking warrant in order to 
encourage the government to use electronic tracking in a sufficiently focused 
manner. 
Part II provides a brief primer on the origins of the Fourth Amendment and 
tries to discern basic, overriding principles contained within the amendment, which 
was largely influenced by a fear of “general warrants” that gave the government 
broad authority to conduct unspecific searches.  Part III tracks the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence relating to surveillance technologies.  Part IV describes the two most 
common forms of tracking technology—GPS units and cell phones—and outlines 
the state of the law around their use, emphasizing the arguments for why their 
employment should qualify as a search.  Finally, Part V examines the types of 
warrants currently available and proposes a new tracking warrant aimed at 
minimizing the ability of government officers to capture information that is outside 
the immediate scope of their investigations. 
It should be noted from the outset that this article is specifically concerned 
with tracking that is “prolonged” in nature.  This, of course, invites the dilemma of 
deciding when tracking becomes “prolonged.”  Because of the need to provide law 
enforcement officers with guidance, should such tracking ever be deemed a search 
under the Fourth Amendment, a bright-line rule will likely be necessary to provide 
clarity.  However, for the purposes of this article, we can proceed with the basic 
                                                                                                     
 12. Id. at 562-64. 
 13. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 14. Fourth Amendment issues are implicated in both the installation and the monitoring of tracking 
devices.  This article will focus strictly on the monitoring or use of these devices as opposed to their 
physical installation.  However, the Supreme Court has ordered the parties in United States v. Jones to 
brief and argue the issue of whether the installation of the tracking device also constitutes a search. Id. 
(“In addition to the question presented by the petition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the 
following question: ‘Whether the government violated respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights by 
installing the GPS tracking device on his vehicle without a valid warrant and without his consent.’”). 
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understanding that “prolonged” tracking is that which continues beyond the 
duration of a single definable “trip,” whether that trip is to the corner store or 
across the country.  With this in mind, we can consider the outer limits of tracking 
that is not considered “prolonged” to be somewhere around a week.  The 
distinction is important because, as will be discussed below, it is the data produced 
by prolonged tracking that has the most salient Fourth Amendment implications. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE FEAR OF 
GENERAL SEARCHES 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.15 
The Fourth Amendment has been understood to protect the citizen against an 
unjustified breach of his or her rights of property, autonomy, and privacy by 
requiring that agents of the government overcome certain procedural hurdles before 
seizing or searching the citizen or his or her property.16  Although the current 
jurisprudential treatment of the amendment is a matter of great debate—one 
commentator calls it “an embarrassment” and “a mess”17—the circumstances that 
influenced and shaped the amendment are reasonably clear.  The particular sort of 
governmental intrusion that concerned the drafters of the Fourth Amendment was 
found in the form of “general warrants” and “writs of assistance.”18  The general 
warrant was a “warrant, general as to the persons to be arrested and the places to be 
searched and the papers to be seized.”19  As such, a general warrant could not 
possibly issue on probable cause because it required little or no specificity about 
who or what was to be arrested or searched.20  General warrants, however, were 
limited to “a single specific event that created the cause behind the search.”21  
Writs of assistance were a similar device but were subject to even less limitation: a 
writ of assistance authorized a search anytime during the lifetime of the issuing 
                                                                                                     
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 16. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23-24 (2007) (describing how the language of the amendment implicates 
these rights while noting that there is an ongoing scholarly debate over whether the amendment should 
be read to protect a citizen’s privacy).  See also generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 17. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757, 759 
(1994). 
 18. THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 15 (2009).  See also  M. 
Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance From the Mischief That Gave it Birth, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV 905, 912 (2010) (“The immediate aim of the Fourth Amendment was to ban general 
warrants and writs of assistance.”). 
 19. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43 (De Capo Press 1970) (1937). 
 20. Id. 
 21. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 43. 
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sovereign.22  The practical result of this was that the “discretion delegated to the 
official was therefore practically absolute and unlimited”; officials could search for 
contraband whenever and wherever they liked.23  The extreme power that was 
granted to the holder of the writ of assistance was hobbled moderately by the fact 
that the writ did not authorize arrest, and that searches of buildings pursuant to such 
a writ could only be conducted during the day.24 
Although the English common law had long been evolving towards a 
requirement of ex ante review based on probable cause,25 two English cases from 
the 1760s solidified the doctrine subsequently enshrined by the Framers in the 
Fourth Amendment.26  John Wilkes and John Entick were both newspaper 
publishers who had produced pamphlets critical of King George III and had been 
accused of publishing seditious materials.27  In Wilkes’ case, the secretary of state 
issued a general warrant to search for the “authors, printers, and publishers” of his 
pamphlet, but did not name Wilkes.28  Wilkes and forty-nine others were arrested, 
and his private papers were confiscated.29  In the case of Entick, a warrant was 
issued specifying that he be arrested but also ordered that “his papers” be brought 
before the secretary to be “examined,” without specifying which of his papers were 
to be brought.30  Predictably, the government officers inspected all of Entick’s 
personal papers and books and confiscated hundreds of pamphlets and charts.31  
Both men sued, and in both cases, the use of the general warrant was found to have 
been illegal.32  In upholding a jury’s verdict for Entick, Lord Camden of the Court 
of Common Pleas observed that the law did not allow for a general search as a 
means of detecting offenders, and that if such a warrant were legal, “the secret 
cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open to the 
search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the secretary of state shall think fit 
to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, printer, or publisher of a 
seditious libel.”33  He went on to note that the effect of such a warrant would be to 
subject a person merely suspected of libel to having “his most valuable secrets . . . 
taken out of his possession, before the paper for which he is charged is found to be 
criminal by any competent jurisdiction.”34   “If suspicion at large should be a 
                                                                                                     
 22. Id. at 15-16; LASSON, supra note 19, at 53-54. 
 23. LASSON, supra note 19, at 54. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 35-36 (describing a 17th century treatise in which the English jurist Chief Justice Hale 
advocated the illegality of general warrants used to search for stolen goods because they did not require 
that the party asking for the warrant specify the particular place suspected or the probable cause of the 
suspicion). 
 26. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 16-17; Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of 
Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 875-80 (1985). 
 27. LASSON, supra note 19, at 43, 47; Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.) 808; 19 
How. St. Tr. 1029, 1031. 
 28. LASSON, supra note 19, at 43. 
 29. Id. at 43-44. 
 30. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 810; 19 How. St. Tr. at 1033-34. 
 31. Id.at 810; 19 How. St. Tr. at 1034-35. 
 32. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) 499; 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 1168 (1763); 
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818; 19 How. St. Tr. at 1074.   
 33. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1063. 
 34. Id. at 1064. 
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ground of search . . . whose house would be safe?”35  These cases were widely 
publicized and closely followed by both the English public and the inhabitants of 
the American colonies,36 and the Supreme Court has recognized Entick as having 
been particularly influential in the formulation of the Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
stating in 1886 that  
As every American statesmen, during our revolutionary and formative period as a 
nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom, and 
considered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be 
confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed 
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently 
explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.37 
However, the American colonists did not have to look as far as England to find 
examples of heavy-handed intrusion in the name of law-enforcement.  The 
colonists’ interest in the Wilkes and Entick affairs probably reflected the fact that 
they themselves had been made the subject of such arbitrary intrusion, largely in 
the form of writs of assistance.38  In 1761, when customs officers applied to 
reauthorize their writs following the death of King George II, a group of Boston 
merchants, represented by James Otis, petitioned the Superior Court against the 
reauthorization.39  Arguing against the writs, Otis declared that 
[T]he writ prayed for in this petition, being general, is illegal. It is a power that 
places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer. I say I admit 
that special Writs of Assistance, to search special places, may be granted to certain 
persons on oath; but I deny that the writ now prayed for can be granted . . . .40 
Otis and the merchants lost, but their arguments “reverberated across America”41 to 
the degree that John Adams wrote of Otis’s speech that “[t]hen and there the child 
Independence was born.”42 
These well-worn episodes have been included here because they establish the 
“point of departure” for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.43  They illustrate what 
                                                                                                     
 35. Id. at 1073-74. 
 36. Schnapper, supra note 26, at 912-913; LASSON, supra note 19, 45-46; Amar, supra note 17, 772 
n.54. 
 37. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886). 
 38. For a full account of the use of writs of assistance in the colonies, see LASSON, supra note 19, at 
ch. II, who dedicates a chapter to the topic in his book. 
 39. LASSON, supra note 19, at 57-58; MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 18. 
 40. James Otis, Argument before the Massachusetts Superior Court (Feb. 1761), available at 
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/writs.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2011).  Part of the text of Otis’s actual 
speech is available, the rest is taken from an account by John Adams, who witnessed it. 
 41. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 19. 
 42. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 406 n.56 
(1995) (citation to footnote only). 
 43. This view runs counter to a line of scholarship, developed by, among others, Professors Amar 
and Slobogin, which argues that these historical influences on the Fourth Amendment actually show that 
the Supreme Court’s baseline standard of requiring a warrant and probable cause in order to execute a 
search or seizure is a misunderstanding of the intent of the Framers, and has resulted in a flaw-ridden 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that, by requiring that such a high burden be met by law enforcement, 
actually encourages courts to provide exceptions to Fourth Amendment safeguards.  See generally 
SLOBOGIN, supra note 16; Amar, supra note 17. 
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are arguably a set of normative principles embedded in the Fourth Amendment: in 
order for the government to interfere with a person’s right to be let alone, the 
government needs to show that it has a strong reason for its interference and that its 
interference must be directed specifically to deal with this reason.  Thus, the 
government could not search Wilkes’s printing presses without there first having 
been a crime and a certain amount of evidence that Wilkes was involved in that 
crime.  Moreover, even if there was a crime and there was some evidence pointing 
to Entick’s involvement in the crime, the government could not just take all of his 
papers with an eye toward finding more evidence of his involvement.  Rather, the 
government must be able to specify what evidence it is seeking and narrow its 
search accordingly.  The “security” of the citizenry in their “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects,” is to be maintained by minimizing the amount of discretion 
that was given to government officials in relation to their investigative and 
enforcement powers.44  At bottom, the Fourth Amendment is concerned with 
government power and its abuse, and a warrant requirement built on specificity and 
limited discretion is the means by which we have chosen to prevent such abuse.45 
These principles can be useful when addressing new iterations of the problem 
of delineating and managing the frontier between the protected privacy of the 
individual and the need for law enforcement officers to be able to conduct effective 
investigations.  As one Judge has put it, “[t]he Amendment’s vivid history can be 
particularly useful in applying the Amendment to today’s challenges and in 
measuring the consequences of a particular application.”46  In this vein, the Court 
has not restricted the relevance of these influences to its treatment of the seizure of 
papers or searches for smuggled goods.  As observed below, the ideas embodied in 
them have been a source of understanding as the Court has dealt with modern 
iterations of the problem of deciding how a government can go about collecting 
information about its citizens.  However, as its jurisprudence has developed, the 
potential has emerged for the Court to lose sight of broad Fourth Amendment 
principles regarding government interference with the “security” of its citizens and 
focus instead on the vagaries of its own formulations.  
III.  THE SUPREME COURT AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 
This section briefly traces the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence relating to 
surveillance technology.  As noted above, the interpretation and application of the 
Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court has been widely criticized 
for a perceived incoherence.  One of the main difficulties faced by the courts in 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of 
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1334 (2002) (“To the extent that the Wilkes 
decision influenced the Founders, it suggests that the Fourth Amendment was adopted as a means of 
restraining official discretion.”). 
 45. Of course, the wording of the Fourth Amendment does not demand a warrant requirement, but 
merely requires that searches be reasonable.  Professor Amar, among others, argues that we should rid 
ourselves of the warrant requirement and adopt a more flexible reasonableness standard.  Amar, supra 
note 17, at 759.  But see Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 
820, 856 (1994) (arguing that the warrant requirement provides a rule-based approach to reasonableness 
that is necessary in the modern law enforcement context). 
 46. Michael, supra note 18, at 922. 
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applying the Fourth Amendment has been the development of new technologies 
that demand an application of the amendment to situations that were unforeseeable 
by the framers of the Constitution.  As the Supreme Court has noted, “The Fourth 
Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable 
search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve 
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”47  
Automobiles, telephones, airplanes, electronic beepers, and thermal imagers have 
all tested the conception of what it is that the Fourth Amendment protects and what 
constitutes a search or seizure under the amendment.48  Evolving social attitudes 
towards privacy further compound the difficulties associated with technological 
developments.49  These factors, combined with the ever-present interest in effective 
law-enforcement, can make the Fourth Amendment seem like something of a 
moving target. 
Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court had maintained that, in order for surveillance 
to qualify as a search, and thus engender the protection of the Fourth Amendment, 
there must be an “actual physical invasion” of a suspect’s property.50  The case that 
bore the flag for this line of reasoning was Olmstead v. United States, in which the 
Court held that a wiretap of the suspect’s phone did not constitute a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.51  The Court reasoned that “[t]he language of the 
amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching 
to the whole world from the defendant’s house or office.  The intervening wires are 
not part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which they 
are stretched.”52  In his prescient dissent, Justice Brandeis invoked Chief Justice 
Marshall’s reminder that “it is a constitution we are expounding,”53 and urged that 
                                                                                                     
 47. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). 
 48. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 (holding that there was an exception to the warrant requirement in 
the case of automobiles); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1928) (holding that a 
wiretap of a telephone line was not a search regulated by the Fourth Amendment because there was no 
physical trespass); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead and finding 
that a wiretap of a phone booth was a search because the subject of the wiretap had a reasonable 
expectation to privacy when using a telephone booth); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 732, 744-45 (1979) 
(holding that the use of a “pen-register” to record the telephone numbers dialed by a suspect was not a 
protected search because the suspect had no reasonable belief that those numbers would remain private); 
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (holding that using a helicopter to fly over a greenhouse 
in order to look for marijuana was not a search); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) 
(holding that the use of an electronic beeper to track a car was not a search because the car was exposed 
to the public on its travels and so there was no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Karo, 
468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (holding that the use of an electronic beeper to determine if contraband was 
inside a suspects house was a search under the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
34-35 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal imager to scan a suspects house for heat associated with 
a marijuana growing operation was a search).   
 49. See Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology, 75 MISS. 
L.J. 1, 40-42 (2005) (“Our interest in, and desire for, privacy increased in the twentieth century, for a 
variety of reasons.  That interest seems to have reached new levels in the early years of the twenty-first 
century . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
 50. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 465. 
 53. Id. at 472 (Brandies, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. 316, 407 (1819)). 
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the constitution be applied in ways that allowed it to bear on developments in 
surveillance technology.54  Brandeis also made reference to James Otis and Lord 
Camden, noting that “writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny 
instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping.”55 
In 1967, the Supreme Court turned away from the “physical intrusion” 
standard.  In Katz v. United States,56 a case that involved the wiretapping of a 
phone booth by law enforcement officers, the Court declared that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,” and that “what [a person] . . . seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”57  The Court went on to hold that the wiretap was an unreasonable 
search,58 and the lasting formulation for determining whether a search has taken 
place was set forth in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.  The test, he stated, was 
twofold: “first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”59 
The post-Katz Court has examined whether the use of several types of 
surveillance technology constitutes a search.  In Smith v. Maryland,60 the Court 
held that the use of a “pen-register”—a device that could be installed on the phone 
company’s switching equipment and would record the numbers dialed by a 
specified telephone61 -- was not a search.62  The Court reasoned that, by dialing his 
phone, the suspect had voluntarily exposed the digits to the switchboard, which was 
“merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally 
completed calls for the subscriber.”63  Thus, the suspect could not have harbored an 
expectation that the numbers he had dialed would remain private.64  
In United States v. Knotts,65 the case most relevant to the current tracking 
technologies, the Court held that the use of a “beeper” tracking device was not a 
search.66  The government, on suspicion that the defendants were involved in 
                                                                                                     
 54. Id. at 472-74 (“[I]n the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what 
has been but of what may be.  The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of 
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 55. Id. at 476. 
 56. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 57. Id. at 351.  This formulation comes from a concurrence by Justice Harlan.  Justice Stewart’s 
opinion for the majority offered a more complex analysis of Fourth Amendment protections, and it is 
probably owing to this complexity that Harlan’s phrasing has been adopted as the meaning of Katz.  See 
Ricardo J. Bascuas, Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment’s Principled Protection of 
Privacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 583 (2008). 
 58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
 59. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 60. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 61. Id. at 736 n.1. 
 62. Id. at 745-46. 
 63. Id. at 744. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 66. Id. at 284-85.  The “beeper” in question was a radio transmitter that emitted signals that could 
be picked up by a receiver held by officers.  The purpose of the beeper was to enable the officers to 
follow the suspects and find them again if they lost visual contact.  However, as happened in this case, 
too great a distance between the transmitter and the receiver would cause the officers to lose the signal.  
Id. at 277-78. 
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manufacturing drugs, placed the beeper inside a container of chloroform that was 
then sold to the defendants in Minnesota.67  Officers followed the defendants from 
the point of purchase, watched them switch the container into another vehicle, and 
then followed that vehicle into Wisconsin, where they lost the signal from the 
transmitter.68  When a police helicopter equipped with a receiver located the signal 
again, it was coming from the area around an isolated cabin, which was found to be 
a drug laboratory.69  The Court found that the use of the beeper was not a search 
because the beeper only “augmented” the officers’ ability to conduct visual 
surveillance of the suspects’ vehicle, and that because a vehicle “travels public 
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view . . . a 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”70  Notable, 
however, was the Court’s response to the defendant’s argument that unrestricted 
use of beeper technology would create the possibility of “twenty-four hour 
surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without judicial knowledge or 
supervision.”71  The Court demurred, but it said that “if such dragnet type law 
enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then 
to determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”72 
In United States v. Karo,73 the Court was again faced with the use of a beeper, 
but in that case, the law enforcement officers used the beeper signal to show that 
drug-making chemicals had been taken inside a home in order to obtain a search 
warrant for the home.74  In this instance, the Court found that the use of the beeper 
to signal that an item was inside a home was a search because it conveyed 
information about the inside of the house that could not have been confirmed 
visually.75  Furthermore, “private residences are places in which the individual 
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a 
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as 
justifiable.”76 
Finally, in Kyllo v. United States,77 the Court found that the use of a thermal 
imaging device to detect heat from the inside of a house was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.78  The Court stated that where the technology is used to 
“explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without 
                                                                                                     
 67. Id. at 278. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 278-79.  The officers used the information gained from following the beeper to obtain a 
search warrant for the cabin.  Id. at 279. 
 70. Id. at 281-82.  The Court noted that there was no evidence that the beeper had been used to 
determine the location of the chloroform any more specifically than in the general area of the cabin.  Id. 
at 282.  However, it implicitly acknowledged that its analysis would have changed had the beeper been 
used to determine that the container was actually in a private sphere.  Id. at 281-85. 
 71. Id. at 283. 
 72. Id. at 284. 
 73. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 74. Id. at 708-10. 
 75. Id. at 715. 
 76. Id. at 714. 
 77. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 78. Id. at 40. 
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physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable 
without a warrant.”79  The Kyllo court seemed particularly concerned with the fact 
that the premises at issue was the subject’s home, noting that “[a]t the very core of 
the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,”80 and that “the Fourth 
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.”81 
Creating a coherent taxonomy of the Court’s decisions on surveillance 
technologies and the Fourth Amendments in order to predict how the Court will 
rule when faced with a new form of technology is a project that has yielded many 
different interpretations.  In one formulation, the Court’s decisions represent a 
creeping “co-opting” of the Katz standard in order to promote a more stringent 
definition of what qualifies as a constitutionally regulated search than was 
originally envisioned by the Katz court.82  In this view, the Court’s decisions have 
essentially reverted to a pre-Katz definition of a search as relating to an invasion of 
a “constitutionally protected area” as opposed to the victim’s privacy.83  Thus, in 
this reading, it is likely that the Court’s determination about whether or not the use 
of a surveillance technology constitutes a search will be premised on the physical 
area that is being observed. 
Another reading of these cases is that they serve to divide technology into two 
basic categories: that which is “sense augmenting” and that which is 
“extrasensory.”84  While sense augmenting technology gathers information that 
“could theoretically be attained through one of the five human senses,”85 
extrasensory technology “reveals information otherwise indiscernible to the 
unaided human senses.”86  According to this interpretation, the Court generally 
finds that the use of sense augmenting technologies is less constitutionally 
objectionable than the use of extrasensory technologies.87  Importantly, the quantity 
of evidence obtained by either form of technology will act as a trump card when 
assessing whether the use of the technology constitutes a search.88  So under this 
framework, the determination of whether constitutional protections apply will 
largely hinge on the invasiveness of a technology as measured in relation to the 
                                                                                                     
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 81. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)). 
 82. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 241.  See also SLOBOGIN, supra note 16, at 15-16 (describing the 
tendency of the post-Warren courts to use the Katz standard to restrict the regulation of surveillance 
techniques). 
 83. MCINNIS, supra note 18, at 242 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34). 
 84. Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 
55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 432-33 (2007).  See also Ramya Shah, From Beepers to GPS: Can the Fourth 
Amendment Keep Up with Electronic Tracking Technology? 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 281, 288-
89 (2009) (discussing this distinction as applied to GPS tracking in state and lower federal courts). 
 85. Hutchins, supra note 84, at 432-33. 
 86. Id. at 433. 
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extrasensory technology is a search). 
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normal sensory powers of law enforcement officers, as well as the amount and 
specificity of the information the technology reveals.89 
IV.  ELECTRONIC TRACKING 
While technological development has been a constant throughout the life of the 
Fourth Amendment, the last quarter of a century has seen a proliferation of devices 
that, while they enable law enforcement officers to more accurately observe and 
track suspects, also create opportunities for “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means 
for invading privacy.”90  Such devices include powerful cameras equipped with 
biometric face-recognition software, the thermal imagers mentioned above, and 
detection devices that enable law enforcement officers to essentially see through 
clothing in order to find secreted contraband or weapons.  The focus of this article 
will be on recently-developed electronic systems that enable law enforcement 
officers to track the location of a civilian over an indefinite length of time. 
A.  The Technology 
1.  GPS Tracking Units 
One of the most effective and cost-efficient technologies being adapted for law 
enforcement purposes is global positioning system technology (“GPS”).  Originally 
developed by the Defense Department for military uses, GPS systems allow a 
receiver on earth to communicate with multiple satellites orbiting the earth on 
specified pathways.91  By triangulating its location in reference to the satellites, the 
receiver is able to plot its position on the earth’s surface to within two meters.92  A 
GPS receiver can also record latitude, longitude and altitude, as well as direction 
and speed of movement.93  A transmitter in the receiver can then relay the 
information contained therein to a monitoring party.  This can be done either by 
real-time monitoring of the receiver or through periodic wireless uploads of 
information stored in the receiver’s memory.94  The receiver’s memory can also be 
recovered when the receiver is physically retrieved.  Notably, there is no limit to 
the number of GPS receivers that can be in communication with GPS satellites at 
any one time.95 
The most common use of a GPS receiver by law enforcement personnel—at 
least as evidenced by the number of court cases in which the technology is an 
issue—is to track the vehicle of a person or persons of interest.96  A GPS receiver 
                                                                                                     
 89. Hutchins does note that the area being observed can also be a factor in determining whether a 
search has occurred, primarily when that area is a home.  Id. at 442-43. 
 90. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 91. Hutchins, supra note 84, at 414-18. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 418. 
 94. Shah, supra note 84, at 284-85 (internal citations omitted). 
 95. Hutchins, supra note 84, at 418. 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259); United States v. Marquez, 605 
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can easily be affixed to a suspect’s vehicle, and the vast majority of courts have 
held that the actual application of the device to the vehicle does not constitute a 
search or seizure, so long as it occurred on the street or in the suspect’s driveway.97 
While efforts to obtain data on the frequency of the use of GPS tracking by law 
enforcement have largely been frustrated, there are indications that it is becoming 
widespread practice.98  The Department of Justice has encouraged police 
departments to invest in GPS tracking devices by helping to foot the bill for the 
units.99  Such a proliferation is to be expected because the devices are cheap, 
available, efficient, and largely infallible.100  In the surveillance context, GPS 
devices do not require sleep, meals, refueling, or bathroom breaks, and a suspect is 
less likely to notice that she is being monitored when the observer is a miniscule 
device attached to the underside of her car than when it is a bleary-eyed detective 
or surveillance team tailing her throughout her daily travels.101 
Of course, the qualities that make a GPS receiver so attractive as a tool for law 
enforcement also make the technology an item of particular constitutional concern.  
It is subject to none of the practical limitations that serve to discourage employing 
physical surveillance by officers without a very strong reason for believing that the 
suspect has engaged in criminal behavior and that the surveillance will reveal 
evidence of that behavior.102  It can be deployed for as long as desired with a 
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(holding on state law grounds that installation of a GPS unit on the defendant’s car was a seizure of the 
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 98. Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS Device, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2008, at A1. 
 99. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Awards More than $570,000 to Area 
Law Enforcement Agencies to Combat Gangs (Apr. 14, 2008), available at www.justice.gov/ 
usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr0414_01.pdf. 
 100. A brief search of the Internet located commercially available GPS tracking units intended for 
covert use for as low as $199.  GPS Tracking Devices, BRICKHOUSE SECURITY, 
http://www.brickhousesecurity.com/gps-car-tracking-vehicle-logging.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2011). 
 101. See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003) (noting that it is unlikely that officers 
could have “maintained uninterrupted 24-hour surveillance” of a suspect who was tracked by a GPS 
device). 
 102. See Bennett L. Gershman, Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking as Search and Seizure, 30 PACE L. 
REV. 927, 951 (2010) (noting that it would be “inconceivable . . . . given budgetary constraints on police 
work, finite time pressures for different and competing investigations, and limited police personnel,” 
that officers using physical surveillance techniques would have been able to gather the same quality and 
quantity of evidence used against a suspect as was gathered by a GPS device). 
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minimal investment of time or money: the initial cost of the unit, a change of 
batteries when required, and the effort to upload the information from the receiver 
and review it.103  The use of a GPS tracking unit does not, theoretically, even 
require that anyone really ever monitor it until they think that they have a reason 
for doing so.  The unit will passively and comprehensively record the data it is 
designed to collect, whether or not that information has any real law-enforcement 
purpose.  The effect of these characteristics is that vast amounts of information 
about a subject can be gathered in a relatively easy and wholly undiscerning 
manner, and, as will be discussed later, such aggregations of information make it 
possible for law enforcement to learn much more about a person than just their 
physical location.104  Furthermore, these characteristics make it easy for people 
who are uncomfortable with the idea of such profound governmental access to 
information about where its citizens are and what they are doing to envision a 
scenario in which, if left unchecked, all citizens are monitored by the state to 
ensure that they are not engaging in activities that the state does not approve of: the 
dystopian vision of Orwell or Huxley. 
2.  Cell Phones as Tracking Devices 
A second form of tracking device is carried in the purses and pockets of the 
vast majority of Americans.105  The standard cellular phone operates by constantly 
“registering” with the nearest cellular tower or “base station” so that incoming and 
outgoing calls can be accurately directed to and from the phone unit through the 
tower from which the phone receives the strongest signal.106  As the phone unit 
moves and the strength of the signal with one tower declines, the signal is switched 
to a closer tower.107  The record of a phone’s registration with nearby towers is 
called the “cell site” data or the “cell site location information” (CSLI).108  The 
general location of a phone can be determined by locating the tower providing the 
signal to the phone (more specifically, which “sector” or “face” of the tower the 
phone is communicating with) and by measuring the strength of the signal.109 
Thus, like bread crumbs along a path, as a person moves through his day, his 
phone is communicating with cell towers, creating a potential record of his 
movements.110  The precision of this method of tracking the location of a phone 
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unit is variable depending on how many towers service a given location.111  Where, 
as in urban environments, there are more towers, each tower services a smaller area 
and thus a phone’s location can be more accurately plotted.112  Inversely, where 
there are fewer towers, each tower covers a larger area and the range in which a 
specific phone could be located based on its communications with the tower is 
broader.113  There has been a steady trend towards the placement of more towers or 
base stations in densely populated environments in order to provide service for 
increasing numbers of cell phone users.114  As the number of base stations in an 
area increases, the smaller each “sector” becomes, and the more precise the 
location of a cell phone will be in relation to the sectors it is communicating 
with.115 
The use of data from several towers, through a process of “triangulation,” can 
produce even more accurate information about the location of a cell phone.116  By 
measuring the time it takes a phone’s signal to reach multiple towers or the angle at 
which the signal reaches the towers, it is possible to plot the location of the phone 
to within 50 meters.117  In addition to triangulation, extremely accurate tracking of 
cell phone location is being facilitated by the proliferation of GPS receivers 
installed in phones.  In response to the Wireless Communications and Public Safety 
Act of 1999, the FCC promulgated regulations requiring that, by 2005, wireless 
carriers had to be able to provide emergency services with the accurate location of 
any cell phone user who called 911.118  This can be accomplished either through the 
use of triangulation or by the inclusion of a GPS chip inside a cell phone.119 
One important difference between tracking performed through the use of a 
GPS receiver that is installed by law enforcement officers on a suspect’s vehicle, 
for example, and tracking using a suspect’s cellular phone is that in the latter case 
the authorities do not have direct access to the data—they must instead deal with an 
intermediary, the service provider, to obtain the information.  Authorities may 
request either “historical” data, which is used to locate a person’s past locations, or 
“prospective” data, which allows real-time tracking of a suspect.120  As will be 
discussed below, government requests for location data are subject to an uncertain 
statutory framework.  However, it is clear that there is not currently a uniform 
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requirement that a warrant based on probable cause must issue in order to obtain 
cell phone tracking information.121 
Another distinction between the two technologies is that, while a person who 
has had a GPS tracker surreptitiously attached to their vehicle has not intended to 
broadcast their patterns of travel, a person who makes a call using a cellular phone 
does so with (perhaps a vague) notion that the phone is sending and receiving 
signals in such a way that would probably require a cellular network, in some 
manner, to know its general location.  Whether or not this distinction is significant 
for Fourth Amendment analysis will also be discussed below. 
The constitutional concerns surrounding the use of cell phones as tracking 
devices are perhaps even greater than those relating to the use of a GPS unit 
attached to a vehicle.  First, by virtue of possessing a cell phone, nearly every 
American adult can now be tracked by the government.122  Furthermore, not only 
can the government gain access to a citizen’s real-time movements from the point 
at which it becomes interested in tracking the person, but it can also obtain data by 
which it can account for the movements of a person in the past.123  This, combined 
with increased cell-tower density and the fact that improvements in GPS 
technology allow ever increasing tracking accuracy, means that cell phones have 
become a means by which law enforcement could access a nearly unlimited 
agglomeration of the type of data that concerned the Maynard court.124  
B.  The Treatment of GPS Tracking in the Circuit Courts of Appeal 
As noted above, the circuit courts and state supreme courts are currently split 
on whether or not the use of GPS tracking devices by law enforcement officers 
constitutes a search.  With relative economy of space in mind, this survey will only 
examine decisions by circuit courts of appeal as these cases are representative of 
the broader arguments made at all levels. 
The circuit courts have been presented with both the question of whether the 
attachment of the GPS unit is a search as well as whether its use to record 
information is a search, but only the decisions examining use, i.e. monitoring, will 
be dealt with here.  The courts have dealt with these questions in varying detail but 
have found in three cases that use of the devices was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.125  Only in Maynard did a circuit court find that the use of a GPS 
tracking unit was a search.126 
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1.  GPS tracking is Not a Search  
In the cases where circuit courts found that the use of a GPS tracker was not a 
search, their decisions were generally premised on an extension of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Knotts.127  In extending Knotts, the courts made little or no 
distinction between the beeper device at issue in that case and a GPS unit.  Nor did 
these courts distinguish between the relatively short period of tracking in that case 
and the weeks or months of tracking at issue in the cases before them. 
In United States v. Marquez, the Eighth Circuit considered the use of a GPS 
device, albeit in a rather roundabout way.128  In that case, Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) agents attached a GPS tracker to a vehicle that they suspected was 
involved in drug trafficking.129  The defendant was arrested after the investigators 
used the device to track the use of the truck in a drug conspiracy in which he was 
involved.130  When the defendant tried to challenge the legality of the use of the 
device without a warrant, the court found that he did not have standing to challenge 
its use.131  However, the court, citing Knotts, stated that even if the defendant had 
standing, the use of the GPS device would not have been a search because “[a] 
person traveling via automobile on public streets has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one locale to another.”132  Significantly, the court 
made no attempt to distinguish the GPS device at issue in the case from the beeper 
unit used in Knotts. 
In U.S. v. Pineda-Moreno, the Ninth Circuit also failed to make a meaningful 
inquiry into the differences between the older beeper units and units utilizing 
GPS.133  In that case, DEA agents observed the defendant purchasing large 
quantities of fertilizer “of a type frequently used to grow marijuana.”134  After 
identifying the defendant, learning where he lived, and obtaining more evidence 
indicating that he was involved in growing marijuana, agents attached a GPS 
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suspicion prior to installing the device, although there does not appear to have been any requirement of 
an ex ante showing before the installation.  Id. at 610.  Although the court cites to Garcia for this 
proposition, Judge Posner’s opinion in that case appears to only note that the district court judge 
overseeing the initial motion to suppress in Garcia found that reasonable suspicion was a sufficient 
quantum of proof on which to predicate the installation of a tracking device.  United States v. Garcia, 
474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).  The district court judge, in one of her orders on the defendant’s 
motion to suppress, states that she adopted the reasonable suspicion requirement on the recommendation 
of the magistrate judge.  United States v. Garcia, No. 05-CR-0155-C-01, 2006 WL 1601716, at *1 
(W.D. Wis. May 31, 2006).  The district court judge suggested that the court would require an ex ante 
showing in the future.  Id.  This rather ad hoc process of establishing a standard illuminates the need for 
judicial clarity when addressing the question of just what oversight should be applied to electronic 
tracking. 
 133. 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 134. Id. at 1213. 
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device to his vehicle.135  Using multiple tracking units, the agents monitored the 
defendant’s travels over the course of four months and finally arrested him after a 
tracking device showed that he was leaving a suspected marijuana “grow-site.”136  
After arresting the defendant, agents found a considerable amount of marijuana at 
his home.137  The defendant argued that the agents’ monitoring of the device had 
been a search because Kyllo had “heavily modified” the analysis used by Knotts, 
and under Kyllo, the GPS unit would qualify as an extrasensory technology.138  The 
court disabused the defendant of this notion, holding that Kyllo did not apply 
because the GPS units at issue were not extrasensory technology139 but were, in 
fact, sense-augmenting technology because they only allowed the agents to obtain 
the same information that they would have gained by physically following the 
defendant.140  The court went on to hold that, because this sense-augmenting 
technology was not deployed against a “constitutionally protected area,” its use 
could not be a search.141 
Finally, in United States v. Garcia, the case that contains the most considered 
defense of the use of GPS tracking without a warrant, the Seventh Circuit 
recognized that the beeper used in Knotts was a “less sophisticated device” than a 
GPS unit and that GPS tracking holds the potential for “wholesale surveillance.”142  
However, in a somewhat cavalier opinion authored by Judge Posner, the court 
decided that it need not address “[w]hether and what kind of restrictions should, in 
the name of the Constitution, be placed on such surveillance when used in routine 
criminal enforcement,” because the officers involved in the case had “abundant 
grounds for suspecting the defendant” prior to subjecting him to GPS tracking.143  
The defendant in the case had come under the police’s suspicion after several 
informants had told police officers that he was intent on manufacturing 
methamphetamine, and he was observed purchasing ingredients for the drug.144  
Officers installed a GPS unit on the defendant’s car, and, as a result of tracking the 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id.  The court’s opinion only calls the devices that the agents used in this case “tracking 
devices.”  However, the court discusses how the devices retained a record of the defendant’s travels, 
which the agents could access either when they retrieved the units or remotely.  Id. at 1213, 1216.  This 
indicates that the units used by the agents were GPS units as opposed to beeper units. 
 136. Id. at 1213-14. 
 137. Id. at 1214. 
 138. Id. at 1216. 
 139. The court here used the term “sense enhancing” as opposed to “extrasensory,” but the meaning 
is the same in relation to technology that is “sense augmenting.”  See supra Part III. 
 140. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216.  The court viewed the information obtained through the use 
of the tracking devices in its narrowest sense, stating that, “[t]he only information the agents obtained 
from the tracking devices was a log of the locations where Pineda-Moreno’s car traveled . . . .”  Id.  As 
will be described below, this narrow view is at odds with the position taken by some courts, which is 
that the information made available through electronic tracking depicts a much broader range of 
behavior than just the physical locations that a person visited.  Especially in cases like this, where the 
tracking is conducted over a span of multiple months, those doing the tracking can divine a person’s 
habits, religious and political preferences, medical issues and much more. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 474 F.3d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 143. Id. at 998. 
 144. Id. at 995. 
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defendant’s travels, were able to discover his methamphetamine lab.145  Judge 
Posner found that the use of the GPS to track the defendant was merely a 
technological improvement on physical surveillance performed by officers and that 
“the [fourth] amendment cannot sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no 
more efficient in the twenty-first century than they were in the eighteenth.”146 
2.  GPS Tracking is a Search 
At the time of writing, there has only been one case in which a circuit court, 
utilizing a theory that had been developed in several state court opinions,147 has 
found that the use of a GPS tracking unit for a prolonged period of time is a search.  
Because the reasoning used in this decision informs the central thesis of this paper, 
and because it provides an ample discussion of most of the arguments for finding 
that such use of GPS is a search, the court’s analysis will be examined in more 
detail than the decisions discussed above. 
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Maynard, found that Knotts did 
not apply where law enforcement officers used GPS tracking to monitor the 
movements of a suspect over the course of a month, and that the use of the device 
for a prolonged period of time constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.148  
                                                                                                     
 145. Id.  Judge Posner’s opinion does not say how long the defendant was tracked using GPS. 
 146. Id. at 998.  By way of illustration, Judge Posner states that similar updates to manned 
surveillance include the use of cameras mounted on lamp posts and satellite imaging “as in Google 
Earth.”  Id. at 997.  Judge Posner’s use of these technologies as examples would seem to provide a false 
mark for measuring whether GPS tracking represents an increase in invasiveness over current 
technologies that do not require a warrant.  Firstly, while real-time satellite-image tracking of a suspect 
would raise all the same constitutional concerns as GPS tracking and more, to this Author’s knowledge, 
Google Earth does not provide live satellite pictures that would enable tracking.  A search of case law 
and other sources turns up no indication that Google Earth or any other live satellite imaging technology 
has been applied by domestic law enforcement agencies to follow a suspect in real-time.  Secondly, 
while cameras mounted on stationary lamp-posts may implicate constitutional concerns, their use 
arguably does not carry the same potential for invasiveness that is the worrying feature of GPS tracking. 
 147. These cases include  Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 2009), People v. 
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009), and State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash. 2003), all of which are 
referred to in Maynard.  In Jackson, the Washington Supreme Court found that a GPS device attached to 
the car of a suspected murderer did not merely augment officers’ senses, but instead recorded the 
suspect’s position regardless of “whether an officer could in fact have maintained visual contact over the 
tracking period.” 76 P.3d at 223.  The court was also concerned by the potential for GPS tracking to 
reveal “a great deal about an individual’s life,” including their “preferences, alignments, associations, 
personal ails and foibles.”  Id.  Likewise, in Weaver, the New York Court of Appeals voiced its concern 
about the “[c]onstant, relentless tracking” that GPS makes possible.  909 N.E.2d at 1199.  The court 
found that GPS represents even more than an “enhancement” of the officers’ senses, “it facilitates a new 
technological perception of the world in which the situation of any object may be followed and 
exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically unlimited period.”  Id.  In both Jackson and 
Weaver, the courts found that their respective state constitutions required that authorities obtain a 
warrant before using GPS tracking.  Jackson, 76 P.3d at 224; Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203.  In Connolly, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court—applying a less-restrictive definition of seizure than have 
federal courts—found that the placement of a GPS tracker on a vehicle was a seizure under the 
Massachusetts constitution because, “by using the GPS device on the vehicle to track its movements the 
police asserted control over it, converting the minivan to their own use notwithstanding the defendant’s 
continued possession.”  913 N.E.2d at 370. 
 148. 615 F.3d 544, 555-56, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. U.S. v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 
3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
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In that case, a combined FBI-DC Metropolitan Police Department task force 
investigating the owner and manager of a nightclub for suspected drug trafficking 
used a GPS unit to track the whereabouts of the nightclub owner’s vehicle around 
the clock for four continuous weeks.149  The pattern of the defendant’s travels 
became one of the central pillars of the government’s case against him.150  When 
the defendant appealed his conviction based on the use of this evidence, the 
government argued that, under Knotts, the GPS device was not a search because the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy during his trips on public 
roadways.151  Unlike the other circuit courts that have evaluated GPS tracking in 
light of the Fourth Amendment, the D.C. Circuit found that the difference in 
technology between the Knotts beeper and a GPS unit—particularly the capability 
of a GPS unit to enable officers to monitor a suspect’s movements for prolonged 
periods of time—was fundamental enough that the Fourth Amendment analysis 
that applied to the one could not be readily transferred to the other.152  The 
Maynard court specifically focused on the Knotts court’s caveat that should 
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . be possible 
without judicial knowledge or supervision,” then “different constitutional 
principles may be applicable.”153  Accepting this invitation, the Maynard court took 
a fresh look at the Katz test as it applied to prolonged GPS tracking. 
The court in Maynard began by defining the “information” that the defendant 
claimed was private.154  Whereas in Knotts the information at issue was the 
defendant’s movement between two locations, in Maynard the information that the 
defendant argued was private was the record of his total travels over the course of 
the twenty-eight days he was monitored.155  The court then examined whether or 
not the defendant had exposed this information to the public, either actually or 
constructively, on the theory that, if he had done so, he could not have had a 
reasonable expectation to privacy, per the Katz standard.156  The court found that 
the defendant had not actually exposed the totality of his movements over the 
course of the month because such exposure, in Fourth Amendment terms, only 
occurs where a person reasonably expects that others will observe it, and in this 
case, the defendant could not reasonably expect that any individual citizen would 
                                                                                                     
 149. Id. at 549, 555. 
 150. Id. at 562 n.*. 
 151. Id. at 556. 
 152. Id. at 556-58. 
 153. Id. at 556 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1982)).  The Knotts Court also 
referred to this twenty-four hour surveillance as “dragnet type law enforcement practices.”  Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 283.  The Maynard court explicitly notes that this language from the Knotts Court is in response 
to an argument from the defendant in that case that the beeper would enable round the clock tracking of 
individual citizens.  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57, n.*.  This is important, because other courts seem to 
have read the Knotts Court’s use of the phrase “dragnet type law enforcement practices” to refer to a 
program of mass surveillance.  See United States v. Walker, 771 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811 (W.D. Mich. 
2011) (applying the Knotts “dragnet” language to “shotgun tactics” where officers attach devices to 
multiple vehicles and wait to see “which device leads to evidence of a potential criminal violation.”). 
 154. 615 F.3d at 558. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  
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observe all of his travels over the course of a month.157 
Significantly, the court also stated that precedent appeared to foreclose any 
argument that, by exposing each of his individual trips, the defendant had 
constructively exposed the whole pattern of his travels during the time he was 
tracked.158  The basis of this finding was that the whole pattern of travel reveals 
more information than would any one of its constituent parts.159  As the court 
stated, this kind of long-term, unblinking surveillance  
reveals types of information . . . such as what a person does repeatedly, what he 
does not do, and what he does ensemble.  These types of information can each 
reveal more about a person than does any individual trip viewed in isolation. 
Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any 
single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a 
month. The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single trip 
to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip followed a few 
weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different story. A person who 
knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a 
heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving 
medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political groups—and 
not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.160 
Having determined that the defendant did not expose the entire pattern of his 
travels to the public, the court then turned to whether or not his expectation of 
privacy in his travels over the course of the four weeks he was monitored was, in 
fact, reasonable.161  In what is probably the most vulnerable part of its opinion, the 
court concluded that the fact that several states had passed laws creating civil or 
criminal sanctions for private use of GPS tracking units and requiring warrants for 
                                                                                                     
 157. Id. at 558-60.  The court recognized implicitly that the first prong of the Katz test, the 
question of whether the subject has manifested an expectation of privacy, has less bearing in 
cases of prolonged surveillance.  As Professor Hutchins puts it, while a defendant trying to 
suppress evidence obtained through a very brief, Knotts-style period of tracking would be 
expected to offer “some evidence of surreptitious behavior, . . . as the period of targeted 
surveillance becomes more protracted (as is possible with GPS-enabled tracking), a 
countervailing reality must be acknowledged--that citizens of this country largely expect the 
freedom to move about in relative anonymity without the government keeping an individualized, 
turn-by-turn itinerary of our comings and goings.”  
Hutchins, supra note 84, at 455. 
 158. Maynard, 615 F.3d. at 560-63.  It should be noted that the government did not make a 
“constructive exposure” argument, so this section of the court’s analysis is essentially dicta.   
 159. Id. at 561-62.  Dicta or not, this “aggregation theory” of the use of surveillance technology is 
notable for directly and clearly addressing what commentators see as one of the principal threats of 
prolonged tracking.  See April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking Technology: The Case for Revisiting 
Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 
B.C. L. REV. 661, 696-97 (2005) (“Even though one may expect fleeting glances in public, and police 
should not have to avert their eyes from what they can see in public, one does not thereby expect the 
kind of targeted aggregation of data a GPS device collects on one’s movements, particularly a kind of 
surveillance the individual neither can detect nor prevent.”); Hutchins, supra note 84, at 458 (observing 
that GPS tracking enables law enforcement to compile a record, not only of comings and goings, but 
also of “friends, associates, preferences, and desires.”). 
 160. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562. 
 161. Id. at 563. 
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government use of such devices,162 as well as the fact that several state courts have 
found that GPS tracking by law enforcement requires a warrant,163 was “indicative 
that prolonged GPS monitoring defeats an expectation of privacy that our society 
recognizes as reasonable.”164 
Next, the court addressed the distinction between prolonged surveillance using 
GPS, and physical surveillance conducted by law enforcement officers.  The 
government argued that the rationale employed in finding the use of GPS units to 
be a search would have the effect of making officers’ visual surveillance of public 
acts also qualify as a search.165  The court reaffirmed that its holding was grounded 
in the fact that the reasonable expectation at issue was not whether someone would 
observe a single trip from one place to another, but whether someone would 
observe all of the defendant’s trips for a month, and that this did not implicate brief 
instances of visual surveillance.166  The court also indicated that it need not address 
instances of prolonged visual surveillance that might have mirrored the facts in the 
case at hand, if for no other reason than that the government had made no showing 
that such surveillance was ever used, and that the potential for such surveillance 
was severely constricted by the enormous amount of resources it would demand 
and the inherent difficulty in conducting successful long-term surveillance.167 
Finally, and most importantly, the court distinguished between GPS 
surveillance and visual surveillance on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of surveillance technologies had determined that “when it comes to the 
Fourth Amendment, means do matter.”168  For instance, where an undercover 
officer wore a wire and recorded a suspect, there was no search, but where the 
same information was obtained through a wiretap, the Court found that there had 
been a search.169  “Quite simply, in the former case one’s reasonable expectation of 
control over one’s personal information would not be defeated; in the latter it 
would be.”170 
Based on its findings that the defendant had possessed a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the totality of his movements over the course of four 
weeks and that he had not exposed this larger pattern of movement to the public, 
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that law 
                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 564 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-4, 77-23a-7, 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 
2010); MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.37, 626A.35 (2010); FLA. STAT. §§ 934.06, 934.42 (2010); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 17-30-140 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 13, §§ 176.6, 177.6 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 803-
42, 803-44.7 (2010); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5761 (2010)). 
 163. Id. (citing State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223-24 (Wash. 2003); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 
1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009); Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009)). 
 164. Id.  The court, however, did acknowledge that these indicators are “not conclusive evidence of 
nationwide societal understandings.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Id. at 565. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  The court noted that a Special Agent involved in the investigation of the defendant had said 
during the trial: “Physical surveillance is actually hard, you know. There’s always chances of getting 
spotted, you know, the same vehicle always around, so we decided to use GPS technology.”  Id. at 565 
n.* (citations omitted). 
 168. Id. at 566. 
 169. Id. (citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 429 (1963); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 353 (1967)). 
 170. Id. 
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enforcement officers had conducted a warrantless search of the defendant when 
they tracked him using GPS technology and, because the defendant had been 
convicted based on evidence obtained through that search, overturned his 
conviction.171 
There is little indication that the “aggregation theory” announced by the D.C. 
Circuit in Maynard will be adopted widely in regard to GPS tracking units or that 
the decision will even stand.172  Only guidance from the Supreme Court or 
Congress will go any length in settling the matter.  However, the decision in 
Maynard is an important one.  It is an attempt, within the current framework of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, to give voice to a widely held belief that, at least 
in normative terms, the Constitution was designed to keep the government from 
monitoring its citizens to the degree that it would be able to learn their secrets 
without showing good reason for needing to do so.  The line over which the 
Government was not to step was much clearer when people’s secrets were kept 
locked away in desk drawers, and the practical demands of physical, man-to-man 
surveillance meant that the government was more likely to be judicious in 
monitoring its citizens’ activities.  Tracking technology has changed this dynamic, 
and the Maynard decision presents a method of framing the threat posed by GPS 
tracking in a way that brings that threat under the powers of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Maynard rationale has also proved to be helpful to courts 
dealing with another form of electronic tracking, one that poses arguably more 
threat to the privacy of citizens and also is regulated by a more complex legal 
framework: cell phone tracking. 
C.  Cell Phones as Tracking Devices: Statutory Framework and Divided Treatment 
in the District Courts  
Courts’ treatment of the use of cell-phones as tracking devices, both for 
prospective and historical location data, differs fundamentally from their treatment 
of GPS tracking units because of the existence of a hodgepodge of relevant federal 
statutes governing telecommunications as well as the requirements of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The fact that cell phones are so widely owned and do 
not have to be installed onto the property of the suspect makes them appealing as 
tracking devices, but the trade-off for law-enforcement officers is that the 
information they are trying to obtain173 is in the possession of a third party, the 
cellular service provider, and a court-order is necessary under the relevant statutes 
in order to compel the service provider to give out this information.  It is the 
request for such a court order, usually from a federal magistrate judge, that 
provides the forum for the judiciary’s determination of what restrictions, either 
statutory or stemming from the Fourth Amendment, apply to cell phone location 
data.  The quantum of proof required for the government to acquire this data is far 
                                                                                                     
 171. Id. at 568. 
 172. The Justice Department’s original petition for certiorari for Maynard was denied.  Maynard v. 
United States, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010) (mem.).  However, on June 25, 2011, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case of United States v. Jones, the case of the specific defendant whose tracking was at 
issue in Manyard.  United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 173. See discussion in supra Part IV.A.2.   
2011] THE PROLONGED ARM OF THE LAW 309 
from a settled question.  As one federal magistrate judge who is prominently 
involved in this issue has said, “[e]ach year . . . busy magistrate judges issue 
hundreds of ex parte cell phone tracking orders, with literally no appellate guidance 
concerning the proper threshold showing for their issuance--probable cause versus 
something less.”174 
The following sections will discuss the statutory framework applicable to 
government use of cell-phone location data, specifically CSLI.  It will then discuss 
the differing ways in which the courts have interpreted this framework when 
confronting requests for both prospective and historical data, and will note a 
growing trend in recent years towards requiring a showing of probable cause in 
order for law enforcement officers to compel release of cell phone location 
information. 
1.  The Statutory Framework 
The main body of law that bears on the use of cell phones as tracking devices 
is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).175  The three 
components of ECPA are Title I: The Amended Wiretap Act,176 Title II: The Stored 
Communications Act,177 and Title III: The Pen/Trap Statute.178  These statutes set 
forth a system whereby the standard of proof necessary for the government to 
obtain information rises, roughly, in correspondence to the private nature of the 
information sought and the invasiveness of the means of obtaining it. 
The Pen/Trap Statute demands the lowest standard of proof on the part of the 
government.  Under the statute, if the government makes a showing that the 
“information likely to be obtained . . . is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation,” then the court is required to issue an order allowing the government 
to install a pen-register or trap-and-trace device.179  These devices are used to 
identify the source-device of communications coming to a suspect’s phone or 
computer or the intended recipient-device of communications sent by the suspect, 
but are not meant to capture the actual content of the communications.180   
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)181 
affects the implementation of the Pen/Trap Statute, requiring that “information 
acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices 
. . . shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the 
subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the 
telephone number).”182  This statute explicitly shuts off the possibility that law 
enforcement will be able to obtain CSLI through a pen/trap order. 
                                                                                                     
 174. Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 177, 212 (2009). 
 175. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified throughout title 18 U.S.C.). 
 176. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West 2011). 
 177. Id. §§ 2701-12. 
 178. Id. §§ 3121-27. 
 179. Id. § 3123(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. § 3127(3)-(4). 
 181. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-10 (West 2011). 
 182. Id. § 1002(2)(B). 
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Under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), records related to electronic 
communication 
may be issued by any court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue 
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.183 
Importantly, the definition of “electronic communication” specifically excludes 
“any communication from a tracking device.”184 
Finally, the Amended Wiretap Act requires that, in order to intercept the 
contents of any electronic communications, the government must make a showing 
necessary to meet the “super warrant” requirements outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 2518, 
including a “particular description of the type of communications sought to be 
intercepted.”185  A court order for a wiretap can only issue upon a finding by the 
judge that, among other factors, there is probable cause to believe both that a 
suspect “has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense” and that 
communications related to that offense will be intercepted.186  The extra 
requirement that gives this procedure its nickname is that the government must 
show that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”187  
Because the Amended Wiretap Statute governs the interception of “content,” it is 
not at issue when considering orders for CSLI, although some groups have argued 
that it should be.188 
In addition to the statutory requirements of the ECPA, Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 41 states that “a magistrate judge with authority in the district 
has authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device,”189 
and that “[a]fter receiving an affidavit or other information, a magistrate judge . . . 
must issue the warrant if there is probable cause to . . . install and use a tracking 
device.”190  Thus, although the discussion above demonstrates that there is no 
current statutory requirement that a warrant be issued in order to use a tracking 
device, pursuant to this rule, any federal court order for the use of a tracking device 
requires a showing of probable cause. 
It is within the framework provided by these statutes and rules that government 
officers and judges, without the benefit of any real appellate oversight, have tried to 
                                                                                                     
 183. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (emphasis added) (incorporating the definition of “electronic 
communication” found at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12)). 
 184. Id. § 2510(12)(c).  18 U.S.C.A. § 3117(b) defines a tracking device as “an electronic or 
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.” 
 185. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(1)(b)(iii). 
 186. Id. § 2518(3)(a)-(b). 
 187. Id. § 2518(3)(c); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order (1) Authorizing the Use of a Pen 
Register & a Trap & Trace Device (Orenstein II), 396 F. Supp. 2d 294, 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing 
the difference in requirements between an ordinary Rule 41 warrant and a “super warrant”).   
 188. See Brief for The Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amicus Curiae Opposing the Government, 
at section III.B, Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (arguing that cell phone tracking 
implicates the same privacy concerns that led to the creation of the wiretap act). 
 189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4). 
 190. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1). 
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determine what level of proof is necessary in order to secure an order compelling 
the release of cell phone location data.  The following sections will outline the 
approaches to this issue taken by federal magistrate judges, and will note the 
emergence of a vocal group of magistrate judges who require a showing of 
probable cause in order to issue an order to release CSLI. 
2.  Prospective Location Information 
The issue of how to deal with government requests for prospective CSLI—that 
is, court orders for service providers to turn over data on communication between a 
suspect’s handset and cell towers that would occur in the future—appears to have 
largely emerged in 2005, apparently due to the efforts of several federal magistrate 
judges.191  Government requests for prospective CSLI data are based on one of two 
grounds: 1) pursuant to the SCA alone, arguing that the CLSI constituted records of 
electronic communications under the SCA, and could be released by the provider 
pursuant to an order obtained on the basis of a “specific and articulable facts” 
standard,192 and 2) pursuant to a combination of the Pen/Trap Statute and the SCA, 
which would also apparently provide the authority for the government to obtain 
prospective CSLI with a “specific and articulable facts” showing (this is known as 
the “hybrid theory”).193 
Confronted with these arguments, magistrate judges have examined each 
                                                                                                     
 191. There do not appear to be any published opinions on the issue prior to 2005.  This probably 
owes to the fact that opinions on the matter were sealed or otherwise unreported, and the indication is 
that, prior to 2005, government requests for CSLI were routinely granted.  Recognizing this, Federal 
Magistrate Judges James Orenstein of the Eastern District of New York and Stephen WM. Smith of the 
Southern District of Texas both went to the apparent extra effort of making their opinions on the orders 
public and instigating a transparent judicial debate on the issue.  See Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d 562, 
566 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the magistrate judge had found no federal case law on point, although 
he did acknowledge having previously “granted applications for similar relief, as recently as April 1, 
2005, without questioning the legal basis for doing so or suggesting that there might be none”); In re 
Application for Pen Register and Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Authority (Smith I), 396 
F.Supp.2d 747, 748-49, 749 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (stating that the case under consideration appeared to 
be a matter of first impression in that circuit, that the only reported decision on the issue was Orenstein 
I, and that because of the importance of the issue, and despite sealing the underlying order, he would not 
seal his opinion on the case). 
 192. Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563.  Judge Orenstein mistakenly stated that the government was 
attempting to classify CSLI as “contents of . . . electronic communication” under § 2703(a) of the SCA.  
Id. (emphasis added).  He acknowledged this mistake in his reconsideration of the request, which 
contains a more detailed account of his rejection of the request for an order for CSLI, noting that CSLI 
would be a record of electronic communication, as opposed to the contents of that communication.  
Orenstein II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 302 n.4.  See also Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 749. 
 193. Orenstein II, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 315 (the government did not use the hybrid theory in their 
initial application for an order, but argued that it applied when Judge Orenstein granted a 
reconsideration of his original order); Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761; In re Application of U.S. for an 
Order Authorizing Installation and Use of a Pen Register and a Caller Identification System on 
Telephone Numbers [sealed] (Bredar I), 402 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600 (D.  Md. 2005).  The basis of the 
hybrid theory is CALEA’s amendment of the Pen/Trap Statute so that location information cannot be 
given out by a provider based “solely” on a pen/trap authorization.  47 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B).  The 
government relies on the word “solely” to imply that, under CALEA, the combination of the Pen/Trap 
Statute and the SCA provide sufficient authority to obtain prospective cell site data.  For a clear and 
detailed explanation of the hybrid theory, see Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 761. 
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relevant statute to determine which, if any, could support an order for issuing CSLI.  
They have concluded that the Pen/Trap statute, as amended by CALEA, was unable 
to do so based on the express language stating that information obtained “solely” 
pursuant to a pen/trap authorization could not contain location data.194  The SCA 
would seem to provide the best fit for authorizing CSLI, but the Judges have found 
that it was not up to the task on two grounds: 1) because it contains an exclusion 
relating to records of electronic communications from tracking devices, CSLI could 
not be obtained under the SCA because the release of that data would arguably turn 
the phone into a tracking device,195 and 2) because the SCA deals with “records” of 
electronic communications, it can only authorize the release of information relating 
to communications that have already happened.196 
Finally, most magistrate judges who have published opinions on the matter 
seem to have dismissed the hybrid theory197—in which the combination of the SCA 
and the Pen/Trap statute would allow the SCA to lend the Pen/Trap Statute the 
added authority that the “solely” language of CALEA seems to demand, while the 
Pen/Trap Statute would provide the SCA with the prospective focus that it clearly 
lacks—as being somewhat too fanciful.  Magistrate Judge Smith, in a rationale that 
has been widely adopted, points specifically to the facts that none of the statutes 
reference each other198 and that the various statutes were enacted over the course of 
15 years and in an order that defies the apparent logic of the hybrid theory.199 
Based on this evaluation of the statutory framework, most magistrate judges 
who have published opinions have found that the standard of proof required to 
obtain an order authorizing the release of prospective CSLI is probable cause as 
demanded by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.200  However, several 
magistrate judges have, in published opinions, accepted the hybrid theory and have 
                                                                                                     
 194. Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 565; Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d. at 757-58; Bredar I, 402 F. Supp. 
2d at 603. 
 195. Orenstein I, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 563-64; Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d. at 759. 
 196. Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 760-61. 
 197. Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered Disclosure of Historical Cell Site Location 
Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1768-69 
(2009) (“Generally, the government has had very little success in compelling the disclosure of real-time 
CSLI by way of its hybrid theory argument.”).  But see Christopher Soghoian, 8 Million Reasons for 
Real Surveillance Oversight, SLIGHT PARANOIA (Dec. 1, 2009), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009/12/8-
million-reasons-for-real-surveillance.html (stating that location information can often be gained through 
a hybrid order, and referring to a presentation given by a telecom industry lawyer who stated that each 
major wireless service provider receives over 100 requests a week for location information). 
 198. Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (“Surely if these various statutory provisions were intended to 
give birth to a new breed of electronic surveillance, one would expect Congress to have openly 
acknowledged paternity somewhere along the way.”). 
 199. Id. at 765.  Smith notes that, while the “solely” language in CALEA is supposed to be the 
proverbial key to the lock of the hybrid theory, CALEA went into effect in 1998.  Id.  It wasn’t until a 
2001 Patriot Act amendment to the Pen/Trap Statute, making it apply to “electronic communications,” 
that the CALEA language could have any effect on CSLI. 
 200. Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting A Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns Raised by Law 
Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1082 
(2010) (noting that “a majority of courts require probable cause for these orders” but also noting a 
continued disagreement among the districts).  See also Chamberlain, supra note 197 at 1748 n.19 
(noting that, as of April 2009, of the 28 reported decisions on prospective CSLI, 20 had found that 
probable cause was required to obtain a court order releasing the information).   
2011] THE PROLONGED ARM OF THE LAW 313 
issued orders for the release of prospective CSLI on the basis of a showing of 
“specific and articulable facts.”201  Notably, however, these courts have also 
emphasized that their decisions were also based on the fact that in their cases the 
government was seeking, or their orders allowed, a less invasive level of CSLI.  
For instance, the decisions involved only the data relating to the duration of phone 
calls, and then only information relating the cell tower actually directing the call to 
the phone, as opposed to the three points necessary for triangulation.202  These 
courts argue that the limited level of CLSI released to the government means that 
there is no “tracking” precise enough to create a Fourth Amendment issue where 
the release of CLSI has been authorized with a sub-probable-cause showing.203  
Furthermore, these courts argue that CLSI that is related to a cell phone as it is 
being used to make or receive calls does not convert that cell phone into a “tracking 
device” as contemplated by the Supreme Court.204  Instead of a device being 
installed by the government, here “the individual has chosen to carry a device and 
to permit transmission of its information to a third party, the carrier.”205  Thus, the 
most appropriate analogy would be to the pen register at issue in Smith v. 
Maryland, where the Supreme Court found that a suspect had no expectation to 
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed because he knowingly exposed them to a 
third party.206  Although the reasoning of the courts demanding a probable cause 
standard for the release of prospective CSLI largely avoids this question, it takes up 
a more prominent role in the debate over the standard of proof necessary to obtain a 
release of historical CSLI. 
3.  Historical Location Information 
The terms of the debate over whether probable cause is required for an order to 
release historical CSLI (records of cell site registrations occurring prior to the 
                                                                                                     
 201. In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and 
Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace (Gorenstein I), 405 F. Supp. 2d 435, 438-49 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Application of the United States for an Order (Hornsby I), 411 F. Supp. 2d 678, 
679-81 (W.D. La. 2006). 
 202. Gorenstein I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 437-38; Hornsby I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (“The Government’s 
application in this case seeks only the same information (by type and degree) allowed by Magistrate 
Judge Gorenstein.”). 
 203. Gorenstein I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (“[T]he data being sought by the Government in this 
District is not what amicus believes it to be.  The information does not provide a “virtual map” of the 
user’s location.  The information does not pinpoint a user’s location within a building.  Instead, it only 
identifies a nearby cell tower and, for some carriers, a 120-degree face of that tower.  These towers can 
be up to 10 or more miles apart in rural areas and may be up to a half-mile or more apart even in urban 
areas. Moreover, the data is provided only in the event the user happens to make or receive a telephone 
call.  Thus, amicus’s reference to tracking devices and the cases considering this technology is not on 
point.”).   
 204. Id.  To make this case, Judge Gorenstein relies on a reading of Karo in which it was the 
installation of the beeper, as opposed to its monitoring, that was at issue.  Id. at 449. 
 205. Id.; see also Hornsby I, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 681 (“A cell phone is not a tracking device as that 
term is commonly understood.  Tracking devices are devices that are “installed” at the request of the 
Government.  Cell phones are not “installed.”  They are carried (usually in a person’s pocket or purse) 
and used voluntarily.  Any cell phone user who has ever had a call dropped due to a lack of service 
knows that their cell phone communicates with the nearest tower.”).   
 206. 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1978).   
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application for a court order) are largely the same as those referred to above.207  
However, as Magistrate Judge James Orenstein has noted, when dealing with 
historical records, the SCA more readily applies due to its retrospective 
orientation.208  Because of this, according to Magistrate Judge Stephen Wm. Smith, 
“most courts to date have granted government access to such information under the 
SCA .”209  However, the statutory issue is not necessarily conclusive, and the courts 
that have required probable cause for the release of historical CSLI have largely 
done so on the grounds that to release such information implicates the Fourth 
Amendment.  As one magistrate judge puts the argument, release of historical CSLI 
based on a less demanding standard would  
violate Americans’ reasonable expectation of privacy in any cell-phone-derived 
information/records as to their physical movements/locations by authorizing ex 
parte disclosure of that information with no judicial review of the probable cause. 
It appears to this Court, from its review of current Fourth Amendment case law 
and Constitutional principles, that this information is entitled to the judicial-review 
protections afforded by a probable cause warrant and historically applied to 
movement/location information derived from a tracking device.210 
This view has been supported by the one circuit court that has reviewed a request 
for an order to release historical CSLI, which stated that, unlike the suspect in 
Smith v. Maryland, cell phone users are not generally aware that the company 
stores information about their location even when their phone is not in use, and so 
“[a] cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with 
a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”211 
For the courts which, like the Third Circuit, distinguish CSLI from the pen 
register at issue in Smith, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Maynard has provided 
further justification for questioning the constitutionality of historical CLSI obtained 
                                                                                                     
 207. For a comprehensive explanation of the rationales on both sides of the CSLI discussion as it 
stood through 2008, see Chamberlain, supra note 197, at 1775-88. 
 208. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-Site Information 
(Orenstein III), 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“I have previously concluded—and continue 
to believe—that as a statutory matter the SCA permits a court to issue the order the government now 
seeks without a showing of probable cause.”). 
 209. Smith II, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (referencing several recent cases from other federal district 
courts.). 
 210. In re U.S.for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose 
Records to the Government (Lenihan I), 534 F. Supp. 2d 585, 610-11 (W.D. Pa. 2008) rev’d, 620 F.3d 
304 (3rd Cir. 2010). 
 211. In re U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose 
Records to the Government (Sloviter I), 620 F.3d 304, 317-18 (3rd Cir. 2010).  Interestingly, the Third 
Circuit overturned the magistrate judge’s decision in Lenihan I requiring a showing of probable cause, 
determining instead that the text of § 2703(d) required a showing of articulable facts at a minimum, and 
gave judges the discretion to require a showing necessary for a warrant.  Id. at 319.  The court clearly 
implied that one of the considerations in determining whether a warrant was required would be the 
Constitutional consequences of the government’s request.  Id. at 317-19.  See also Smith I, 396 F. Supp. 
2d at 756-57 (referring to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Forrest, 355 F.3d. 942, 951-52 
(6th Cir. 2004) by saying “the Sixth Circuit was persuaded that Smith did not extend to cell site data” 
because “cell site data is not ‘voluntarily conveyed’ by the user to the phone company . . . it is 
transmitted automatically during the registration process, entirely independent of the user’s input, 
control, or knowledge.”). 
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without a showing of probable cause.  Magistrate Judges Orenstein and Smith have 
both issued opinions stating that the theory undergirding Maynard212—what 
Orenstein calls the “intimate portrait theory”—is relevant and instructive in regard 
to historical CSLI, and its application compels a finding that government 
acquisition of historical CSLI can constitute a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.213  In reaching this conclusion, Magistrate Judge Orenstein found no 
distinction based on the real-time nature of the tracking at issue in Maynard and the 
retrospective nature of the CSLI being contemplated in the case before him.214  The 
“intimate picture” painted by prolonged surveillance “is no less intimate simply 
because it has already been painted.”215  Furthermore, he found that there was no 
distinction between the invasion of privacy caused by GPS and that caused by 
CSLI.216  Nor did he find that the subject of tracking had a more reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his vehicle than he did relating to his cell phone.217 
The law on what standard of proof is required for the government to obtain cell 
phone location data is still a murky pool.  A majority view that probable-cause is 
required in the case of prospective CSLI may have coalesced, but it is by no means 
unanimous.  Things are even less clear when it comes to historical CSLI.   While it 
is likely that the majority of magistrate judges will still grant orders for the release 
of historical CSLI based on a showing of articulable facts, there is a growing 
clamor being raised by the same magistrate judges who chose to broadcast their 
reasons for requiring probable-cause in order for the government to obtain 
prospective CSLI.  The probable-cause position also seems to have been energized 
by the Maynard decision and the Third Circuit’s decision in Sloviter I.  One thing, 
however, is for sure: for at least six years, magistrate judges and district courts, 
joined in 2010 by a circuit court, have been appealing to Congress to bring clarity 
to these questions.218  Without a definitive solution, it seems likely that many 
magistrate judges will continue to grant orders for CSLI based on a showing of 
articulable facts without issuing opinions and that prosecutors will venue-shop to 
                                                                                                     
 212. See discussion of Maynard supra Part IV.B.2. 
 213. See Orenstein III, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 582, 596; Smith II, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 838. 
 214. Orenstein III, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 585 (“The fact that the government seeks information that has 
already been created says nothing about whether its creator has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
that information.”). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 589-91.  The government’s premise on this count was that CSLI could not locate a subject 
as accurately as GPS, and that, in this case the only data requested was that generated while the phone 
was making or receiving calls, and so its use did not rise to the level of a search.  Id. at 589-90.  
Magistrate Judge Orenstein noted the increasing accuracy of CSLI, and found no distinction between the 
limitations of CSLI data obtained only during calls, and the GPS tracking in Maynard, which only 
tracked the vehicle itself and did not account for the suspect when he was on foot.  Id. at 590-91. 
 217. Id. at 592-594.  The government argued that a telephone user has less of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding their telephone’s location than a driver does their vehicle’s location 
because a cell phone user “should know” that when they place a call the service provider is informed of 
the cell tower being used.  Id. at 592.  Magistrate Judge Orenstein acknowledged the most cell phone 
users are aware of the possibility that their phones can divulge their location to the service provider, but 
stated that the increase in location-based services in phones has corresponded with an expectation 
among consumers that this tracking technology could be controlled or turned off, and that the 
dissemination of location data was subject to their approval.  Id. at 593. 
 218. See Chamberlain, supra note 197, at 1788-89 (describing the need for a legislative solution). 
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the extent possible until they find the magistrate judge who will get them the 
information they want with the minimal showing necessary.  One commentator has 
proposed a simple statutory fix, whereby Congress pass a single statute to the effect 
of: 
(a) A court shall not grant a Government application to compel disclosure of cell 
site location information, whether real-time or historical, and shall not otherwise 
order disclosure of such information, except upon a showing of probable cause as 
authorized by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
(b) This law shall serve as the sole authority upon which a court may order 
disclosure of real-time and/or historical cell site location information.219 
Such a legislative solution would certainly go a long way in improving the 
protection of individuals’ privacy interests, but, as discussed below, it might still 
fall short of the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment. 
V.  THE NEED FOR A SPECIAL TRACKING WARRANT 
So where do we stand now?  In most jurisdictions, government officers do not 
need a warrant to install and monitor a GPS device on a suspect’s vehicle, tracking 
that individual wherever they drive for as long as the officers like.  There are 
concerns, however, that the prolonged tracking of individuals using this kind of 
technology represents an invasion of a sphere in which the tracked individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize—the totality 
of their movements over an extended period of time—and now the Maynard 
decision as well as several state court decisions, have given this view a judicial 
foothold.  There seems to be a slightly more general acceptance that officers must 
obtain a Rule 41 warrant in order to compel a cell phone service provider to release 
prospective cell phone location information, but this requirement is by no means 
universal.  With regard to historical cell phone location data, the majority position 
seems to be that a warrant is not required, although there is a determined minority 
of federal magistrate judges who, relying in part on the same logic that informed 
the Maynard decision, require a warrant in order to compel the release of records 
necessary for the prolonged tracking of a subscriber’s movements. 
Let us for a moment forget precedent and the current state of the Katz test for 
determining when a search has occurred.  It seems likely enough that, if we focus 
on the broader principles contained in the Fourth Amendment—that officers of the 
government cannot be given broad discretion to interfere in the lives of citizens, 
even if they suspect them of lawbreaking—the Amendment would demand that the 
use of location tracking technology be considered a search.  This technology makes 
it possible for the government to insinuate its investigative tentacles into the 
intimate and everyday portions of a people’s lives in such a constant and broad 
manner that it would inarguably have troubled the authors of the Constitution, one 
of the main purposes of which was to check the powers of the government in 
relation to the individual.  Prolonged electronic tracking, and cell-phone tracking 
specifically, provides the government with the capability to compile records of the 
activities of individuals that are Stasi-esque in their scope, and their use indicates a 
                                                                                                     
 219. Id. at 1789. 
2011] THE PROLONGED ARM OF THE LAW 317 
very different relationship between the government and individual than was 
contemplated by the founders.  Mass-surveillance aside, to be able to record an 
individual’s movements for a month without even having to expend more than a 
single manpower hour or make a preliminary evidentiary showing to a judge in 
order to do so, as is currently the case with the use of GPS units, is a massive grant 
of discretionary power to the government official and is suspect in the light of the 
Amendment’s history.220  The rationale put forward in the Maynard decision and 
by several federal magistrate judges in CSLI cases manages to satisfy these broader 
Fourth Amendment principles while still operating within the current 
jurisprudential framework.  But, if these decisions are widely adopted and 
prolonged tracking found to be a search, would that be enough?  Does a judicial or 
legislative determination that prolonged electronic tracking is a search and requires 
a search warrant go far enough in limiting the government officer’s discretion as 
the Fourth Amendment seems to demand? 
Perhaps because the question of whether or not prolonged use of the tracking 
technologies requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment and applicable 
statutes has not been answered convincingly, proponents of the warrant 
requirement for prolonged tracking have not yet reached the second-order issue of 
whether a search warrant, as currently conceived of, would provide adequate 
Fourth Amendment protections.  Accepting the mosaic theory advanced in 
Maynard and adopted in recent historical CSLI cases, the prolonged use of tracking 
technologies opens vast tracts of an individual’s private life to government 
officials.  This is owing to the fact that a tracking device, whether a GPS unit or a 
cell phone, is a blunt tool—it will collect the data it is designed to collect without 
discrimination, making no allowance for whether a person is engaged in activities 
other than those that interest the investigator.  Tracking a person for a prolonged 
period can reveal all manner of activity that the individual would have considered 
secret: not only that someone is regularly visiting a known drug market, but also 
that they are involved in a fringe religion or are part of an environmental protest 
group.  As one federal magistrate judge has put it in the context of CSLI,  
there is a legitimate scope problem with using a cell phone as a tracking 
device. The probable cause affidavit for CSLI rarely suggests that every activity in 
the target’s life is illegal activity, yet receipt of CSLI will permit the government 
to “follow” the phone user’s movements 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, wherever 
they go, whatever they are doing.221 
It would seem that, in order to uphold the Fourth Amendment principles of 
specificity and limited official discretion, as illustrated in the Entick affair, the 
                                                                                                     
 220. Indeed, the power to track a person over a long period of time does not just make the 
government privy to information about a person that that person does not want to share, but can also 
impact other Constitutional rights.  Just the threat of tracking can have a chilling effect on behavior, 
serving to suppress political protest, driving it deeply underground and insulating the dominant party 
from dissent.  This possibility is not the product of civil-libertarian paranoia.  In its report on domestic 
intelligence activities and the rights of Americans, the Church Committee observed that “[t]he 
Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their political beliefs, 
even when those beliefs posed no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign power.”  
Church Committee, supra note 8, at section C. 
 221. In re Application of U.S. for an Order (Austin I), 727 F. Supp. 2d 571, 582 (W.D. Tex. 2010). 
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process by which government officials are able to gain location information about a 
person should be tailored to provide as little information that is unrelated to the 
potential crime in question as possible.  A failure to place such procedural 
limitations on electronic tracking would run the risk of warrants being issued that 
would function as general warrants: allowing for the collection of large volumes of 
unspecified information whether it was relevant to the investigation at hand or not. 
A.  The Current Warrant Options  
1.  The Standard Search Warrant 
The standard search warrant, based as it is on the language of the Fourth 
Amendment, is designed to apply to situations where the government is trying to 
find physical property or evidence.222  A list of the typical grounds for which a 
warrant may issue includes: 
(1) evidence of a crime; 
(2) contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed; 
(3) property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime; or 
(4) a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.223 
In order for a warrant to issue, an affidavit establishing the grounds for issuing the 
warrant and specifying the person or place to be searched must be sworn to before 
the issuing judge.224  The judge will then make a determination as to whether there 
is probable cause to believe that the grounds for issuance exists: that there has been 
a crime and that the search at issue will lead to recovery of the specified evidence, 
contraband or property that has been used in the crime.225   
Referent as it is to physical evidence, the standard search warrant procedure 
does not create a framework that is readily adaptable to prolonged electronic 
tracking.  Specifically, it does not provide any mechanism for dealing with the 
ongoing nature of the search and the fact that, by tracking a suspect over a 
prolonged period of time, the officers will necessarily be obtaining information 
beyond the specific information sought.  More fundamentally, there is the question 
of what, exactly, is the “place to be searched”? 
Traditional search warrants create an unclear time frame for how tracking 
would proceed.  A federal search warrant requires that a warrant be executed within 
14 days of issuance,226 but what this would mean in the context of electronic 
tracking is not entirely clear.  In the case of real-time tracking to be conducted in 
the future, such as a request for prospective CSLI or the use of a GPS unit, would 
execution encompass only the request for data from the cell service provider and 
the installation of the device, or would it also encompass the actual time period of 
the tracking?  In requests for historical CSLI, would the execution of a warrant 
                                                                                                     
 222. See Orin S. Kerr, Search Warrants in an Era of Digital Evidence, 75 MISS. L.J. 85, 86 (2005) 
(“The existing law governing the warrant process presumes one-step searches common to the collection 
of traditional physical evidence.”). 
 223. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c). 
 224. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(A). 
 225. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1). 
 226. FED. R. CRIM. P.  41(e)(2)(A)(i). 
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apply only to the request for the information, thus allowing a request for 
information from a length of time limited only by the duration of the suspect’s cell 
phone account and the government’s ability to make a case that the information 
would include relevant evidence?  This would open huge amounts of information 
about a person to government eyes, defeating the principles of specificity and 
limited discretion contained in the Fourth Amendment. 
2.  The Current Federal Tracking Device Warrant 
In 2006, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were amended to include 
specific provisions relating to warrants for tracking devices.227  These amendments 
go some way in clearing up the difficulties in applying the standard warrant 
requirements to the use of tracking devices.228  They provide that federal magistrate 
judges must, upon a finding that there is probable cause that a grounds for issuance 
exists, issue a warrant for the installation and use of a tracking device.229  The 
warrant itself must specify the person to be tracked and specify a reasonable time 
that the device can be used, with a maximum limit of 45 days subject to extension 
on a showing of good cause.230  Furthermore, the amendments require that the 
officer obtaining the warrant must note the exact time of installation, as well as the 
period during which it was used.231  The officer must also serve a copy of the 
warrant on the person who was tracked within 10 days of the date on which the 
tracking ended, although the government may request that notice be delayed if 
authorized by statute.232 
While these requirements more clearly meet the challenge of providing a 
procedural framework that fits the context of electronic tracking—specifically in 
accounting for the fact that tracking is an ongoing process as opposed to a 
traditional physical search—they do not necessarily provide the maximum 
assurance possible that the information obtained through tracking will be 
adequately specific and that it will sufficiently limit the discretion of government 
officers.  Most problematic in this sense is the allowance for tracking a person up to 
45 days (or beyond, if an extension is granted).  As noted above, it is likely 
impossible to utilize a tracking device in such a way that it records only 
information that there is probable cause to believe will be evidence of a crime or 
will lead to evidence of a crime.233  The scope of the information obtained will 
always be greater than what is allegedly sought.  If the goal is to allow government 
officers to use tracking information in order to obtain specified evidence (or 
                                                                                                     
 227. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 advisory committee notes (2006 amendments). 
 228. The rule refers to the definition of “tracking device” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b).  See 
supra note 184. 
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specified data that will lead to evidence) but at the same time restrict, to the highest 
degree possible, extraneous information, a potentially 45-plus day tracking period 
without judicial oversight is too broad.  It is too broad because, simply, it does not 
create enough of a procedural burden to the government to balance the fact that the 
government will be able to access much more information than it will actually 
need.  Setting a default rule requiring more judicial oversight by decreasing the 
length of time that tracking could continue without reauthorization would 
encourage government officers to seek highly specified information (i.e. not engage 
in fishing expeditions) and to go about obtaining it in the most efficient way, thus 
limiting as much as possible their access to information unrelated to what they are 
seeking.  Although the current rule can clearly be used by magistrate judges to this 
effect, it also allows for the possibility that magistrate judges sympathetic to the 
government can allow for long tracking periods in situations where the evidence 
provided in the government affidavit might not merit extended tracking. 
Moreover, the current wording of the rule leaves some doubt about the 
treatment of cell-phone tracking.  As federal magistrate judges have noticed, the 
definition of tracking device is so broad that when cell phone location information 
is sought to such a degree that it allows tracking, it is difficult to argue that a cell 
phone does not qualify as a tracking device.234  However, the current tracking 
device warrant requirements technically leaves the issue open to debate, allowing 
for the potential of a massive gap in the regulation of electronic tracking by the 
government. 
B.  Suggestions for an Electronic Tracking Warrant 
As discussed above, the current warrant requirements, whether under 
traditional search warrants or under the Federal tracking device warrant, may not 
provide the most effective protection from the government’s ability to access 
information to which it is not entitled under the Fourth Amendment.  What follows 
are several general suggestions for state rules committees, the Federal Rules 
Committee, or, alternatively, Congress, to consider in crafting electronic tracking 
warrants that will provide the most protection for citizens while still allowing the 
government to use electronic tracking in beneficial ways.235  Several of these 
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suggestions are informed by language from the Amended Wiretap Act,236 which, 
although statutory, represents another instance in which decision makers have tried 
to create adequate safeguards for a surveillance technology that has the capacity to 
capture a much broader amount of information than is relevant to a specific 
investigation.237 
Affidavits in support of a requested tracking warrant should include a 
“particular statement” of the information sought through tracking.  This should 
include either the specific location(s) that a suspect is suspected of visiting (or not 
visiting), or else the nature of an unidentified location that the government is trying 
to identify, and the available evidence that indicates that the suspect’s presence 
these locations constitutes evidence of a crime or will lead directly to evidence of a 
crime.  Although this requirement may be considered inherent in the showing of 
probable cause, a clear statement of the expectation sets a tone of exacting 
specificity. 
Likewise, affidavits in support of a request for a tracking warrant should 
include a statement laying out the evidence indicating that use of a tracking device 
at the present time will yield the information sought.  Thus, to issue a tracking 
warrant, a judge will have to find that, not only is there probable cause to believe 
that a crime has been committed and that tracking will lead to the specified 
evidence of the crime, but also that there is probable cause that tracking during the 
specified period will lead to this evidence. 
A rule creating a tracking device warrant should include language that 
specifically includes requests for cell phone location information when such 
requests have risen to the level of a search under the Fourth Amendment.  Requests 
for cell phone records should be governed by the same requirements that would 
apply to a GPS tracking device because, as discussed above, cell phone tracking 
presents an even more invasive form of tracking.  Moreover, since there is little 
difference between them in terms of the potential for the government to discover 
information not directly relevant to its investigation, the same requirements that 
apply to prospective tracking information should apply to requests for historical 
tracking.  This leaves to the courts or Congress the determination of when a request 
for cell phone location rises to the level of a search. 
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the judge issuing the order should 
have the discretion to set a time limit on the tracking period, but no tracking should 
go on for longer than three weeks (21 days) without reauthorization from the 
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issuing judge.  The judge can reauthorize tracking upon either a showing of the 
results of the tracking period allowed to that point, or else a reasonable explanation 
of a failure to obtain the expected results, as well as a showing of good cause to 
believe that a reauthorization would further the investigative goals specified in the 
initial affidavit.  The 21-day limit is, admittedly, a relatively arbitrary line.  
However, it is an attempt to balance the need for law enforcement officers to have 
adequate time to collect the information they seek with the need for sufficient 
oversight to protect citizens from unfocused investigations that dredge up more 
information than they ought to.  As such, the 21-day limit strikes a reasonable 
balance, and the nature of the showing required for reauthorization should not 
overburden issuing judges. 
These suggestions represent relatively minor tweaks to the current Federal 
tracking warrant requirements.  However, they create a slightly more burdensome 
procedure for the government, a procedure designed to ensure that the 
government’s use of tracking technology is narrowly focused on specified, 
judicially sanctioned ends. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Comment has attempted to map the legal landscape in relation to 
electronic tracking and to give a sense of the ongoing attempts that are being made 
to fit what for many is a visceral feeling—that warrantless location tracking is 
somehow violative of a fundamentally American relationship between the 
individual and the state—into the framework of the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment Jurisprudence.  It has also suggested that, should the Supreme Court 
find electronic tracking, or some forms of it, to be a search, a specific warrant with 
more safeguards than traditional search warrants and the current federal tracking 
warrant will be needed in order to provide sufficient protection from government 
overreach, whether accidental or purposeful. 
In the coming term, the Supreme Court will weigh in on this issue.  When they 
do, let us hope that as they look again at their precedent, they do so with one eye on 
the basic notions of specificity and limited discretion underlying the Fourth 
Amendment.  As the Court itself said in Boyd v. United States, in reference to Lord 
Camden’s decision in Entick: 
The principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of constitutional 
liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then 
before the court . . . they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and 
its employ[ees] of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not 
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the 
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal 
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been 
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,—it is the invasion of this 
sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s 
judgment.238 
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Its decision in United States v. Jones will be another opportunity for the Court to 
realign its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with the technology employed by 
government agents in order to safeguard the “privacies of life.”  However, even if it 
finds that prolonged electronic tracking is a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
protecting “personal liberty” and “personal security” demands that the Court, or 
Congress in its stead, must do the work of tailoring further procedure to prevent the 
“unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual.”239 
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